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Abstract
I raise two objections against Christian List and Peter Menzies’
influential account of high-level causation. Improving upon some of
Stephen Yablo’s earlier work, I develop an alternative theory which
evades both objections. The discussion calls into question List and
Menzies’ main contention, namely that the exclusion principle, applied
to difference-making, is false.
1 Introduction
At first pass, it seems obvious that properties studied by the special sciences
can be causes. If you ask virologists what caused recent spikes in viral
infections, they might point out (among other things) that as the weather
gets colder people tend to stay indoors for longer, where viruses spread more
easily. If you ask economists about the causes of the 2007 financial crisis,
they might cite the prevalence of subprime mortgages in the run-up to the
crisis. Here, the cited causes are high-level properties, concerning (in the
first case) human behavioral tendencies and (in the second case) properties
of financial markets.
At second pass, however, the claim that special science properties are
causes is in tension with three common theses about the metaphysics of these
properties: (1) that special-science properties supervene on microphysical
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properties;1 (2) that special-science properties are nonetheless not identical to
(since multiply realized by) microphysical properties; and (3) a thesis about
the causal powers of the microphysical: that every physical property which is
caused at all is caused by a microphysical property.
The tension arises as a result of exclusion arguments, prominently defended
in various forms by Jaegwon Kim (2000; 2005). The centerpiece of these
arguments is the ‘exclusion principle’, which Kim holds to be ‘virtually an
analytic truth’ (Kim, 2005, p. 51). One possible formulation of the principle,
adapted from List and Menzies (2009), is as follows:
Exclusion: ‘For all distinct properties F and F* such that [F
necessitates F* ], F and F* do not both cause a property G.’ (List
and Menzies, 2009, p. 490)2
To see the tension, suppose that a special-science property S is a cause of
some physical property. By (3), there’s a microphysical property, P , causing
the physical property. By (1), S is metaphysically necessitated by some
microphysical property; very plausibly, that property is P itself. Finally, by
(2), P is distinct from S. So, both a microphysical property and a distinct
special-science property it necessitates are causes of the same effect. This
conflicts with Exclusion. So S isn’t a cause of any physical property.
In two papers, Christian List and Peter Menzies (2009; 2010) (henceforth
“LM”) set out to defend the causal efficacy of special science properties. They
propose to interpret “cause” in terms of a relation of difference-making, and
claim that this interpretation can salvage the causal autonomy of special-
science properties. Sometimes, high-level properties make a difference to the
occurrence of an effect, without any low-level property making a difference.
Hence condition (3), regarding the causal power of the microphysical, is false:
Some physical effects don’t have microphysical difference-makers. Further,
according to LM, sometimes both the high-level property and the low-level
property are difference-makers. Exclusion is false too.
The basic idea behind LM’s account is not new: LM acknowledge that the
concept of difference-making is closely related to the idea that causes must be
proportional to their effects; an idea which they attribute to Stephen Yablo
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(1992). Roughly, causal proportionality says that causes have to contain just
the right amount of detail given the effect. They should neither incorporate
overly specific information that’s causally irrelevant, nor omit detail that’s
causally significant.3
This paper identifies two problems for LM’s account. The centerpiece of
their account is a theory of the truth conditions of claims about difference-
making. The truth conditions involve counterfactuals, for which LM supply a
nested-sphere semantics similar to the one proposed by David Lewis (1973).
The first problem is that LM’s truth conditions are often insufficiently sen-
sitive: They qualify too many properties as difference-making causes. The
second problem arises from a deviation from Lewis’s semantics LM implement.
The deviation, I’ll argue, introduces an additional unexplained free parameter
into their semantics, diminishing the account’s explanatory power.
I’ll then develop a different implementation of the proportionality intuition,
in the spirit of Yablo (1992). The implementation solves both problems.
Further, it still identifies proportional causes which consist of special science
properties, thereby recovering special sciences’ causal autonomy. Contra LM,
however, the account entails Exclusion. (The only thesis it denies is (3);
that is, it confirms that some physical properties have special-science causes
without having microphysical causes.)4,5
2 The Account
Recall Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals (Lewis, 1973): The semantic
model consists of an assignment to each world of a system of centered, nested
spheres. The system is supposed to convey information about the comparative
similarity of possible worlds in the following sense: If some possible world i
lies outside of a given sphere S centered around world w, all possible worlds
within S are more similar to w than i is to w. Simplifying Lewis’s account
somewhat, require that any system (set) Sw of spheres centered around w
satisfy the following constraints. Where P is any proposition, call any sphere
which has non-empty overlap with P a “P -permitting sphere”:6
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• Nestedness: For all spheres S, T ∈ Sw, either S ⊆ T or T ⊆ S.
• Strong Centering : {w} ∈ Sw, i.e. the smallest sphere containing w is
the sphere that contains only w.
• Exhaustiveness: W ∈ Sw, i.e. the system of spheres contains a largest
sphere consisting of all possible worlds.
• Limit Assumption: For any non-empty proposition P , there is a smallest
P -permitting sphere around w. In symbols: For any non-empty P ,
define minP (w) :=
⋂
{S ∈ Sw |S ∩ P 6= ∅}. Then minP (w) ∈ Sw and
minP (w)∩P 6= ∅ (that is, minP (w) is the smallest P -permitting sphere
around w).
The truth conditions for counterfactual conditionals are then as follows. For
any proposition X, call any possible world satisfying X an X-world. Then,
(CF) P →Q—read “If it was the case that P , it would be the
case that Q.”—is true at w if and only if every P -world in the
smallest P -permitting sphere around w is a Q-world. In symbols:
P →Q is true at w iff P ∩ minP (w) ⊆ Q. (Cf. Lewis, 1973,
p. 20)
In the following, I’ll call the intersection P ∩minP (w) the “closest P -worlds
to w”. In more casual terms, a counterfactual is true at w if and only if its
consequent is true in all worlds which satisfy the antecedent while remaining
‘as similar as possible’ to w.
LM provide necessary and sufficient conditions for difference-making in
terms of two counterfactuals (List and Menzies (2009, p. 483), adapted for
notation; see my fn. 7 below):
(DM): x makes a difference to y in the actual world if and only
if actually (i) x→ y and (ii) (¬x)→¬y.
Here x and y quantify over events, and I’ve adopted the following short-hand:
Inside counterfactuals, “x” stands for “x occurs”, and analogously for “y”
(and “z”, introduced later). E.g. “¬x” abbreviates “¬(x occurs)”; etc. So
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“(¬x)→¬y” is to be read “If x hadn’t occurred, y wouldn’t have occurred”.
The same holds for the other logical connectives; e.g. “x ∧ y” abbreviates “(x
occurs) ∧ (y occurs)”. Where x is an event, I’ll call any world where x occurs
an x-world.7
The truth conditions for LM’s counterfactuals (i) and (ii) are as above,
with one crucial exception: LM replace Lewis’s strong centering with
• Weak Centering : For all S ∈ Sw, w ∈ S.
This replacement allows the smallest sphere around w to contain additional
worlds besides w.
The modification is required since otherwise condition (i) of (DM) wouldn’t
do its proper work. It would automatically be true for any actually occurring
x and y: If x and y actually occur, then, by strong centering, y occurs in
all closest x-worlds (namely, the actual world). (That is, strong centering
implies “And-to-If”: “x→ y” is true if antecedent and consequent are both
true.) LM want to avoid this. Replacing strong centering by weak centering
achieves this, intuitively, by expanding the set of closest x-worlds, such that
a consequent may fail to hold at some closest-antecedent worlds despite being
true at the actual world.
Let’s illustrate LM’s account with an example (List and Menzies, 2010):
Suppose you’re waving for a taxi. Consider two candidate difference-makers
for your action: a high-level mental state, your intention to wave for a taxi;
and the state’s microphysical realizer, the exact neural state n. Which one
made a difference to your waving? Your mental state plausibly satisfies
condition (ii): If you hadn’t intended to wave for a taxi, you wouldn’t have
waved. By contrast, LM claim, the microphysical realizer violates condition
(ii): If you hadn’t been in the exact neural state n, you would have been in a
slightly different neural state n′ which still realizes your intention to wave
for a taxi. So you’d still wave. If that’s right, we have an instance of what
LM call ‘downwards exclusion’: Some property is a cause, while one of its
low-level realizers is not.
There’s also the opposite phenomenon, ‘upwards exclusion’: Some prop-
erty is a cause, while some higher-level property is not. On LM’s account,
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condition (i) is typically responsible for upwards exclusion. To illustrate, con-
sider a third candidate difference-maker: your intention to wave (simpliciter).
(What I mean here is [your intention to wave] simpliciter, not your intention
to [wave simpliciter ]. When you intend to wave for a taxi, necessarily you
instantiate the former, but you may lack the latter.) Suppose condition (i) is
satisfied by your intention to wave for a taxi: In all closest worlds in which
you intend to wave for a taxi, you indeed wave for a taxi. Your intention
to wave simpliciter, however, may violate condition (i): There may be some
closest world in which you intend to wave, but do not intend to wave for
a taxi. (Instead, you might intend to wave at a friend across the street, or
at an airplane passing overhead.) (Note the crucial role of strong centering
failure in this reasoning.) If so, your intention to wave simpliciter violates
condition (i). For presumably when you intend to wave in some alternate way,
you do not wave for a taxi. Hence your intention to wave simpliciter isn’t
a difference-maker according to (DM). So we have an instance of upwards
exclusion.
Now for the problems of LM’s account.
3 First Problem: Missing Downwards Exclusion
The first problem is that condition (ii) doesn’t achieve downwards exclusion
in all relevant cases. Consider the following variant of a well-known case from
Yablo (1992):
(Sophie) Sophie is a pigeon trained to peck at all and only red
objects. Scientists place two objects, a crimson disk and a blue
disk, into a box. They pull out one disk at random and place it
in front of Sophie. They happen to pick the crimson disk, and
Sophie pecks.
The disk’s being crimson seems superfluous for Sophie’s pecking in the same
way in which one’s neural state seems superfluous for one’s waving for a
taxi. An account of proportionality plausibly shouldn’t draw the line between
crimson in (Sophie) and my neural state in the taxi case. Yet this is what
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LM’s account does. Let “RED” and “CRIMSON” abbreviate “the target’s
being red” and “the target’s being crimson”, respectively. Condition (ii)
excludes CRIMSON iff, had the target not been crimson, Sophie might still
have pecked. But this is implausible in the current setup. The only other
available target is blue. Surely, then, had the target not been crimson, it
would have been blue. So Sophie wouldn’t have pecked. So CRIMSON
satisfies condition (ii). (And of course, since RED satisfies condition (i), and
RED entails CRIMSON, CRIMSON also satisfies condition (i).)
More formally, let “PECK” abbreviate “Sophie’s pecking”. To include
RED and exclude CRIMSON we need both
(ii-RED) ¬RED → ¬PECK, and
(¬ii-CRI) ¬(¬CRIMSON → ¬PECK).
But in the current setup we have
(SETUP) ¬CRIMSON → ¬RED.
Since CRIMSON entails RED, (ii-RED) is equivalent to
(ii-RED*) (¬CRIMSON) ∧ (¬RED)→ ¬PECK.
But LM’s semantics (like Lewis’s) validates the schema (“Cumulative Transi-
tivity”):
A→ B, (A ∧B)→ C |= A→ C.
Hence, (SETUP) and (ii-RED*) entail
(ii-CRI) ¬CRIMSON→ ¬PECK,
contradicting (¬ii-CRI). So, provided that LM’s account counts RED as a
difference-maker, it counts CRIMSON as a difference-maker too. And that’s
the wrong result.
Intuitively, the general problem is that LM’s condition (ii) excludes a
low-level realizer only if the presence of the high-level difference-maker is
“counterfactually robust” against changes in the low-level realizer (i.e., in the
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example: only if (SETUP) is false). But, as (Sophie) shows, counterfactual
robustness doesn’t always track difference-making; sometimes even a fragile
difference-maker excludes its realizer.
Yablo (1992) makes a similar point. He first asks us to imagine that
Socrates guzzled the deadly hemlock rather than drinking it slowly. Guzzling
the hemlock doesn’t make a difference to Socrates’s death—drinking it does.
LM’s counterfactual criterion concurs: Presumably, had he not guzzled the
hemlock, Socrates would still have consumed the hemlock (drinking it in an
orderly manner). But now consider the following variant, where death does
counterfactually depend on guzzling:
(Sloppy Socrates) ‘Imagine that Socrates, always a sloppy eater, had
difficulty drinking without guzzling, to such a degree that if the guzzling
hadn’t occurred, the drinking wouldn’t have either. Then Socrates’
death was contingent on his guzzling the hemlock ... Intuitively [how-
ever], it appears that not all of the guzzling was needed, because there
occurred also a lesser event, the drinking, which would still have done
the job even in the guzzling’s absence.’ (1992, p. 276)
Condition (ii) goes astray by picking up on additional features of the case,
Socrates’s habits, which are irrelevant to the guzzling’s proportionality.
3.1 A Fix: Requiredness
Notwithstanding its problem, condition (ii) seems to capture something right.
At least in the sort of simple systems we’re dealing with (cf. fn. 4), an
effect should be contingent on the difference-maker. This is well captured
by condition (ii) (which, following Yablo, I’ll call Contingency). But the
previous discussion suggests that even antecedents which satisfy Contingency
can contain excessive detail. So we need a better criterion to capture “excessive
detail”.
Yablo (1992) offers some guidance. Let x be some event, and consider all
events necessitated by x. Now suppose that any of those high-level events
occurs without x. Then, following Yablo, say that x’s occurrence is required for
an effect iff, in all those cases, the effect would have been absent. Intuitively,
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x’s being required means that the effect wouldn’t occur even if a very similar
event was instantiated (“very similar”, in the sense that the event’s occurrence
necessitates many of the same high-level events as x does). Formally, define:8
Yablo-Requiredness: x is Yablo-required for y iff, for all z
whose occurrence is necessitated by x’s occurrence, (¬x) ∧ z →¬y.
For example, had the target not been crimson but still red, the pigeon would
still have pecked. Hence CRIMSON is not (Yablo-)required for PECK.9 The
idea is then to add the following condition to LM’s account (DM):
(iii) x is Yablo-required for y.
Is this satisfactory? It seems to do a good job with (Sophie), and handles
related cases like (Sloppy Socrates) analogously. It seems to constitute a
significant improvement over LM’s demand for mere Contingency.
But there’s trouble: The criterion mishandles disjunctive events. To
illustrate, let WORM be the target’s having a worm attached to it, and
consider the occurrence of (RED ∨ WORM). This occurrence is necessitated
by RED’s occurrence. But it is not the case that (¬RED ∧ (RED ∨WORM))
→ ¬PECK, for the antecedent logically entails WORM’s occurrence, and
Sophie (let’s suppose) always pecks at a worm. So, according to the above
criterion, RED is not (Yablo-)required for PECK; it is “screened off” by (RED
∨ WORM).10 It follows from (iii) that RED doesn’t make a difference to
PECK. (McGrath (1998) raises the same issue.) Indeed, any event that’s
“robustly sufficient” for PECK spoils the soup: If its occurrence suffices for
PECK even in RED’s absence, then disjoining it with RED yields an event
that screens off RED. (For another example, consider (RED ∨ SPASM),
where SPASM is the target’s being such that Sophie has a muscle spasm,
making her peck at the target.)11,12
We can fix this bug by stipulating that being screened off by badly
disjunctive events does not detract from requiredness:
Requiredness: x is required for y iff, for all not badly disjunctive
z whose occurrence is necessitated by x’s occurrence, ((¬x) ∧
z) →¬y.
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The practice of excluding badly disjunctive events is familiar from counter-
factual accounts of causation. For instance, Lewis (1986b, p. 267) wants to
avoid that, in a situation in which Fred’s talking causes Ted’s laughing, Fred’s
talking-or-walking causes Ted’s laughing as well. He achieves this by barring
bad disjunctions of events from qualifying as events altogether. We may
implement that ban too. If we do, the restriction to “not-badly-disjunctive”
z’s follows for free, and Requiredness and Yablo-Requiredness are equivalent.
For explicitness, I’ll continue to use “events” in the more permissive sense.
(For the purpose of this essay, I’m intending to stay largely neutral on
how “bad disjunction” is best defined. But for concreteness, here is one
proposal.13 Langton and Lewis (1998) and Lewis (2001) define a property’s
bad disjunctiveness via a notion of comparative naturalness for properties.
Analogously, we may define an event’s bad disjunctiveness via a notion of
comparative naturalness for events.14 Then say that an event x is badly
disjunctive iff, for some of x’s disjunctive expansions, all of the disjuncts are
much more natural than x itself.15)
McGrath (1998) considers, but rejects, a similar-sounding response on
Yablo’s behalf:
‘[Yablo] could rule out disjunctive properties as determinables of their
disjuncts. The problem is that this may well be the best justification
for counting pain as a determinable [of] its underlying brain states’.
(171)
However, McGrath’s proposal does not distinguish between good and bad
disjunctions. Perhaps non-reductive physicalists, like Yablo and LM, should
agree that the property of being in pain is a disjunction of properties of the
form being in x, where x is a neural state. But they shouldn’t agree that the
disjunction is bad (e.g. that it is much less natural than all of its disjuncts).
In fact, mental properties seem like paradigm examples of good disjunctions.
(The property of being in pain, the property of having a red sensation, and so
on, don’t seem less natural than some of the gazillion detailed neural states
which possibly realize them—arguably, they even seem more natural than
any of them.) So McGrath’s critique doesn’t threaten our account.
10
With the notion of Requiredness in place, we should supplement (DM)
instead with:
(iii*) x is required for y.
Condition (iii*) is satisfied by RED, though also by RED ∨ WORM and
RED ∨ SPASM. (We’ll add an additional criterion to (DM) in section 4.)
3.2 Dropping Contingency
Requiredness turns out to entail Contingency, thus making an explicit demand
for it redundant. Consider the class of necessarily occurring events—events
which occur in any world whatsoever. Some of these events are intuitively
highly non-disjunctive. For example, take the event which, on Lewis’s (1986)
formalism, is the set of all possible worlds. (The event may be essentially
describable as “the world’s existing”, or “the world’s being identical to some-
thing”.) It is intuitively highly non-disjunctive: Disjunctiveness measures how
“gerrymandered” an event is; and the all-encompassing event is intuitively
highly non-gerrymandered. (Indeed, literal gerrymandering is impossible in
US states with a single congressional district, such as Wyoming or Alaska.)
(The Langton-Lewis account agrees: The set of all possible worlds is the
necessary proposition, and so it is definable by any simple tautology, which
is highly natural—so natural that plausibly at least some disjunct is always
less natural than it.)
Let now x be an event required for y, and let > be the all-encompassing
event. x’s occurrence necessitates >’s occurrence, and so Requiredness implies
((¬x) ∧ >→¬y). Since > necessarily occurs, this implies (¬x)→¬y. So
a demand for Requiredness includes a demand for Contingency.16
On to the second problem for LM.
11
4 Second Problem: Weak Centering
4.1 Difference-Making Is Highly Sensitive to the Size of the
Innermost Sphere
My intending to wave for a taxi is proportional to my waving for a taxi, though
my intending to wave is not. This is upwards exclusion, and LM’s framework
enables it (mostly17) via condition (i), combined with strong centering failure.
To recall, on LM’s semantics, my intending to wave simpliciter—abbreviated
“INTEND-S”—is supposed to violate condition (i): ¬(INTEND-S→ TAXI).
The trouble with LM’s semantics is that what events violate (i) depends
very sensitively on the size of the innermost sphere. (Here and throughout, by
“innermost sphere” I mean “innermost non-empty sphere”.) Consider figure 1.
It depicts three possible systems of spheres, centered around the actual world
w, where I wave for a taxi. (INTEND is my intending to wave for a taxi.
In a slight abuse of notation, I also use INTEND to denote the proposition
that I intend to wave for a taxi. Analogously for INTEND-S, etc.) In each
figure, the inner circle/ellipse indicates the innermost sphere around w, and
the two outer circles indicate the second-closest and third-closest spheres to
w, respectively. The shaded oval region T around w is the set of all relevantly
close worlds where I wave for a taxi. (“Relevantly close”, since there may
be other worlds where I wave for a taxi, but they lie far enough away to be
safely ignored.) T is a proper subset of INTEND, since close to the actual
world I end up waving for a taxi only if I also intend to wave for a taxi. (E.g.,
involuntary tics are far removed.) INTEND, meanwhile, is a proper subset of
INTEND-S: Necessarily, I intend to wave for a taxi only if I intend to wave
simpliciter.
Figures 1a-1c vary only in the size of the innermost sphere. But those
small variations make a big difference, given (DM).
• Figure 1a: Both INTEND and INTEND-S are difference-making causes
of T.18
• Figure 1b: With the innermost sphere now extending outside of the T-







(i), since ¬(INTEND-S → T). (In some relevantly similar situations
in which I intend to wave, I don’t wave for a taxi.) INTEND remains a
difference-maker.
• Figure 1c: The innermost sphere is now large enough to contain even
some INTEND-worlds that are ¬T-worlds. As a result, INTEND too
violates condition (i): ¬(INTEND → T). (In some relevantly similar
situations in which I intend to wave for a taxi, I don’t wave for a
taxi—perhaps I experience a sudden weakness, or am distracted by a
friend.) Neither INTEND nor INTEND-S are difference-makers.
This illustrates the issue: Upwards exclusion occurs when high-level events
violate condition (i),19 but whether events violate condition (i) sensitively
depends on the size of the innermost sphere. More concretely, we can prove
that, where x necessitates z, x satisfies (i) while z violates (i) only if the
innermost sphere contains some ¬x-worlds.20 Figures 1a and 1b witness this.
Figure 1c, meanwhile, is a case where an event on an even lower level than
INTEND excludes INTEND and INTEND-S.
4.2 The Size of the Innermost Sphere Is Unexplained
The sensitivity to the size of the innermost sphere is a problem, given that,
as I’ll now argue, the parameter remains wholly unexplained.
To start, it is well known that similarity metrics for counterfactual seman-
tics don’t simply match our naive pretheoretical judgments about “differences
between worlds”. As Lewis (1979, p. 466) points out, the truth of certain
plausible counterfactuals requires that ‘the similarity relation ... disagrees
with ... explicit judgments of what is “very different”’ (List and Menzies
(2009) recapitulate this point).21 So we can’t just rely on our pretheoretic
judgments about similarity to fix the size of the innermost sphere.
One might think we could instead rely on our pretheoretic judgments
about counterfactuals. Take any truth which holds throughout the entire
innermost sphere—some tautology >, say. The innermost sphere is the
intersection of all P such that >→ P (for P holds everywhere throughout
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the innermost sphere iff >→ P ). These conditionals may thus be used to
map out the innermost sphere. A pre-theoretic reading of counterfactuals
with strong centering failure would therefore allow us to approximate the size
of the innermost sphere in a given context.
But it’s doubtful that there is such a pre-theoretic reading. Suppose Anna
says to Beth: “I bet you that, if I flicked the switch, the lights would turn on.
If I’m right, you’ll pay me $1; if I’m wrong, I’ll pay you $1.” Beth accepts,
and Anna flicks the switch. The light turns on. Does Beth have to pay up?
Of course she does. Anna flicked the switch and the light turned on. This is
enough to ensure that Anna wins her bet. Suppose Beth responded: “Ah, you
see: The cable is brittle, and the light bulb isn’t screwed in all the way, and
the fuse is unstable. It wouldn’t have taken much for the light not to turn
on. Indeed, in some very nearby worlds you flick the switch and the light
stays off. So, please, I want my money back!” This complaint is obviously
pointless. No detail of the setup can change the fact that Anna won her bet.
(If such details were to matter, we’d see many more bettors hurry to prove
the modal frailty of the relevant material conditional, after losing a bet on a
counterfactual.) This suggests that there is no pre-theoretic reading of the
counterfactual with merely weakly centered models.22
LM fail to provide any further linguistic data to underwrite a reading
which implements strong centering failure. They recapitulate Lewis’s (1979)
point, noted above, that not every difference between worlds should count
toward dissimilarity. But this doesn’t even provide indirect evidence for
strong centering failure (let alone provide linguistic data). For, as Lewis
himself notes, the point is perfectly compatible with strong centering: ‘[T]here
may not be any worlds that differ from ours only in the respects that don’t
count, even if there are some respects that don’t count’ (466).23
LM go on to suggest some general theoretical reasons for strong centering
failure. They claim that strong centering ‘introduces an unjustified asymmetry
into our reasoning about counterfactuals’ (486):
‘Consider the inference pattern strengthening the antecedent, which
goes from the premise P → Q to the conclusion (P & R) → Q.
... When the antecedent P is false, this inference is generally invalid.
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... However, under Lewis’s strong centering requirement, this inference
pattern is valid when the antecedents of the counterfactuals are true.
But the inference seems equally bad when the antecedent is true as
when it is false.’ (486)
The non-standard use of “valid” in this quote is distracting. By itself, strenght-
ening the antecedent is invalid (in the proper sense of the term) on either
account of centering. Hence there’s no asymmetry here.
LM’s worry, perhaps, is rather this. On either centering assumption, the
following inference is invalid:
1. ¬P
2. ¬R
3. P → Q
Thus, (P & R) → Q




3.* P → Q
Thus, (P & R) → Q
But it’s unclear where the problematic asymmetry is. The two inference
patterns above aren’t symmetrical: 1.* negates 1., 2.* negates 2., but 3.* and
3 are identical. It’s hard to see why the inference patterns should stand and
fall together.
LM continue:
‘This point is especially significant in the case of future-tense coun-
terfactuals whose antecedents are not known to be true or false. It is
crucial to the use of such counterfactuals for prediction and decision-
making that inferences be valid or invalid regardless of the truth of
their antecedents.’ (ibid.)
16
“Valid” and “invalid” are again used non-standardly (an antecedent’s truth
value obviously doesn’t affect an inference’s validity, normally understood).
LM presumably mean to reiterate that the previous two inference patterns
should be either simultaneously valid or simultaneously invalid. As a reason
they note that otherwise our confidence in (P & R) → Q would generally
depend on our confidence in P and R. And this, they claim, is undesirable
for the purpose of ‘prediction and decision-making’. But why think that? In
a situation where one believes that Q is true, for example, it seems perfectly
reasonable to increase one’s confidence in (P & R) → Q upon gaining
evidence that P and R are true.
So it’s not clear that there are any theoretical reasons to embrace strong
centering failure, nor that strong centering failure explains any (pretheoretical)
linguistic data. Both issues make LM’s theory unappealing as a semantic
theory of counterfactuals. Moreover, they make it unappealing as a theory of
(difference-making) causation. For we are left with a parameter, the size of
the innermost sphere, which sensitively influences the account’s predictions
yet remains wholly unexplained—it is determined neither by linguistic data
nor by independent theoretical considerations. This doesn’t make for a good
theory of difference-making causation.
Further, it also limits the interest of LM’s main theoretical result, Exclu-
sion failure. Whether in any given case an event excludes another depends
crucially on the size of the innermost sphere. So we are left without a good
sense of when (and when not) exclusion occurs. Indeed, for all we know, it
always does occur: Suppose x and z, such that x properly necessitates z,
satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) for some effect y. It turns out that we can
always modify the innermost sphere such that exactly one of x and z satisfies
(i) and (ii).24 So, for all we know, the innermost sphere conspires to save
Exclusion, even on LM’s account.
4.3 A Fix: Enoughness
We should look for a theory that’s compatible with strong centering. Yablo
(1992) is again of some help. One of Yablo’s criteria does the work of condition
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(i) even given strong centering.
Plausibly, x’s being proportional to an effect requires that x’s realizers
aren’t required for the effect. A realizer is required, intuitively, only if the
effect depends sensitively on the realizer’s occurrence. A required realizer
thus indicates that x contains too little information (if x had occurred, but
with the a slightly different realizer, the effect would not have occurred).
Define then25
Enoughness: x is enough for y iff no event whose occurrence
necessitates x’s occurrence is required (in our sense) for y.
Now replace (i) in (DM) with:
(i*) x is enough for y.
(i*) excludes overly unspecific events. COLORED is not enough for PECK,
since RED is required. Similarly, INTEND-S is not enough for TAXI, since
INTEND is required.
Moreover, though, even RED isn’t enough; for example, RED∧Sophie’s
being able to move is also required. (Sophie wouldn’t peck if she were
immobilized.) And even the latter is excluded, since an even finer conjunction
is required (the target also has to be in pecking distance, it must be bright
enough to see, etc). In general, on our account, difference-makers will be
rather detailed conjunctions of events, capturing all aspects of the situation
required for the effect.
This is a demand for causal detail, but one compatible with causal
proportionality. Proportionality is, in the first instance, a theory of vertical
causal selection, of locating causes at the “correct level of nature”. It is
therefore acceptable if horizontal selection—the project of distinguishing
salient causes from mere “background conditions”, primarily within a single
level of nature—is treated separately.26
Since Mill (1874, Ch. 5) it is commonplace to distinguish between “whole”
and “contributing” (or “partial”) causes.27 The new account may be viewed
as delivering proportional whole causes, as opposed to mere proportional
contributing causes. (Contributing causes may be recovered from the whole
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cause, of course, by considering its conjunctive expansions (ways of writing
the event as a conjunction of events).) This strikes me as a reasonable
output for a theory of proportionality, and a marked improvement upon LM’s
account.
5 Exclusion Saved
Let’s review. My first criticism against LM has been that condition (ii)
sometimes picks up on factors irrelevant to proportionality. I’ve suggested to
replace it with a version of Yablo’s (1992) criterion, that causes be “required”,
with a proviso ruling out badly disjunctive properties. My second criticism
has targeted LM’s modification to Lewis’s counterfactual semantics. The
worry has been that their modification makes causation sensitive to the size of
the innermost sphere, an unexplained parameter with questionable theoretical
and pre-theoretical credentials. An alternative approach, compatible with
orthodox strongly centered semantics, adopts Yablo’s demand that propor-
tional causes be “enough”. (At the same time, though, not everything from
Yablo (1992) should be imitated.28)
The modified Yablo-style proposal can be summarized thus. We start
with two formal features of events (I’ve added the terms “higher-level” /
“lower-level” for easier comprehension):
• Requiredness: x is required for y iff, for all not-badly-disjunctive
higher-level events z (events whose occurrence is necessitated by x’s
occurrence), ((¬x) ∧ z) →¬y.
• Enoughness: x is enough for y iff no lower-level event (event whose
occurrence necessitates x’s occurrence) is required for y.
An event x is then a difference-making (or “proportional ”) cause of an event
y iff x is both required and enough for y. (Of LM’s original proposal only
condition (ii) remains, as an implication of x’s Requiredness.)
Having developed our alternative account, let’s harvest its fruits. We have
at least two noteworthy upshots. First, and most plainly, the new account
19
shows that superior alternatives to LM’s account exist. Our account is superior
both in being more extensionally adequate, and in being theoretically and
explanatorily more satisfactory (due to a strongly centered semantics).
Second, and more interestingly, the new account denies LM’s main theo-
retical result, the falsity of Exclusion. LM’s account permits cases in which
both an event and its realizer cause the same effect. (This happens whenever
the causal influence is ‘realization-sensitive’: whenever, that is, an event x is
a difference-maker of effect y, but where, had x occurred without some actual
realizer z, y wouldn’t have occurred (List and Menzies, 2009, p. 493). On
LM’s theory (DM), z is a difference-maker of y in this case.29) Thus LM’s
theory permits failures of Exclusion.
By contrast, our Yablo-style account entails Exclusion: Suppose, for
contradiction, that z is distinct from but necessitates x, and both x and
z make a difference to y. Then, by definition of difference-making, x is
enough for y, and so y requires no event distinct from but necessitating x. In
particular, y does not require z. But then, by definition of difference-making,
z does not make a difference to y, in contradiction with our assumption. It
follows that no two distinct events x and z, where the occurrence of one
necessitates the occurrence of the other, are difference-making causes of the
same effect.30
Now, I do not claim that my account is the final word on the matter.
(In particular, it would be desirable to extend the account to handle cases
of preemption and overdetermination.) But so much at least is clear: The
truth of Exclusion, when restricted to difference-making causation, is an
open possibility. And settling the question requires careful attention, not
only to the theoretical virtues of specific theories of causation, but also to





1The relevant notion of supervenience here is strong individual supervenience: That is,
necessarily, for any special-science property S, everything that has S has some microphysical
property P such that, necessarily, everything that has P has S. (The relevant modality is
metaphysical necessity.)
2By ‘F necessitates F* ’ I mean that, necessarily, every F is an F*. List and Menzies
instead write ‘F* supervenes on F ’. This is loose talk, as supervenience, properly understood,
relates not individual properties but sets of properties. To avoid confusion, I use strict talk
throughout my presentation, distinguishing supervenience and metaphysical necessitation
where necessary.
3For continuity’s sake, I accept LM’s (and Yablo’s) assumption that there is a preferred
meaning of the word “cause” expressing the difference-making relation. But LM’s and
Yablo’s projects remain of interest even if one denies this, e.g. if one thinks that not
every instance of causation is an instance of difference-making. What’s important is
that difference-making occupies a distinctive explanatory role. This guarantees that it’s
independently interesting to model our usage of the concept, and to study its behavior
vis-a-vis exclusion. Further, for the special sciences to be, in many cases, the exclusive
supplier of proportional causes would still amount to a noteworthy sort of autonomy, and
would secure them a privileged explanatory role. I ask readers who are loath to equate
causation with difference-making to replace all occurrences of “cause” with “difference-
making” or “proportional causation”. (For a recent view distinguishing causation from
difference-making, see Lee (forthcoming).)
4 There are alternatives to counterfactuals-based approaches to causal proportionality,
for example Michael Strevens’s (2004) ‘production’ account. In this essay, I put those aside.
Further, I’ll follow Yablo and LM (2009, 478, Fn. 8) in focusing on simple causal systems
only. In particular, I’ll ignore causal systems involving preemption or overdetermination.
Troubles with such systems are familiar and serious, but not unique to the current proposal.
5Initially LM also discuss an alternative reading of the exclusion principle, which replaces
one occurrence of “cause” with “causally sufficient”:
Exclusion*: ‘If a property F is causally sufficient for some effect G, then
no distinct property F ∗ [metaphysically necessitated by] F can be a cause of
the effect G.’ (ibid.: 475; my emphasis)
Following Woodward (2008), List and Menzies (2009, p. 490) read ‘causal sufficiency’ as
something like nomological entailment, and the remaining ‘cause’ as ‘difference-maker’. On
this reading, I agree that Exclusion* is false: Microphysical properties can nomologically
necessitate special-science properties without being difference-makers. Throughout the
essay, I’m concerned with Exclusion and not with Exclusion*.
6Cf. Lewis (1973, Ch. 2) and List and Menzies (2010, p. 6). Compared to Lewis, our
account simplifies by adopting Exhaustiveness and the Limit Assumption. This is merely
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for expository convenience; nothing essential hangs on them.
7LM do not explicitly state (DM) in terms of “events”. Instead, they ask when ‘[t]he
presence of [some property ] F ’ makes a difference to ‘the presence of [some other property ]
G’. I stick to “event”-talk throughout this paper since that’s the more established ideology.
Nothing I’ll say essentially hangs on this terminological departure from LM. For it’s
reasonable to suppose that, for any candidate difference-making property F , the presence
of F is an event. (This is arguably false for generic properties, cf. Lewis’s (1986) worry
about disjunctive cases such as “Jeff’s talking-or-walking”. But what disqualifies them from
denoting events—their disjunctiveness—plausibly also disqualifies them from denoting
difference-makers.) Conversely, my criticism of LM goes through even if we focus only on
the subclass of events expressible, for some F , by pthe presence of Fq.
8Yablo formulates this condition in his own determinate/determinable framework; but
it is straightforward to convert it into an event-theoretic framework.
9 McGrath (1998) proposes a slight variation of Yablo’s condition (pace McGrath, who
claims to reproduce Yablo’s account):
McGrath-requiredness: x is McGrath-required for y iff, for all z realized
by x, ¬((¬x) ∧ z → y).
Restricted to non-vacuous counterfactuals, McGrath-requiredness is weaker than Yablo-
requiredness. They can come apart in rare circumstances, namely when, for some z realized
by x: it might be that y obtains when z is present without x, but it might also be that
y doesn’t obtain in that case. In this case, x may still count as McGrath-required, but
wouldn’t be Yablo-required. Yablo-requiredness seems slightly more faithful to the intuitive
meaning of the word “required”. The fact that Sophie might still have pecked had the target
been non-red intuitively ensures that redness isn’t required for pecking. (That she also
might not have pecked doesn’t seem like a good reason for thinking otherwise.) But being
closer to the intuitive meaning of “requiredness” doesn’t ensure being the superior condition
for difference-making causation. In this respect, I don’t see much daylight between the
two conditions. Did RED make a difference to PECK, since, had the target not been
red Sophie might not have pecked? Or does it not make a difference since she might
still have pecked? I don’t think I have a preference. Indeed, provided that facts about
difference-making causation don’t run metaphysically deep, I’m inclined to think that there
is no fact of the matter here. For concreteness, I’ll stick with Yablo-requiredness in the
following (everything I say will hold for McGrath-requiredness too).
10B “screens off” A relative to effect C iff, had B occurred without A, C might still have
occurred; viz. iff ¬(((¬A) ∧B) → ¬C).
11 LM’s account on its own doesn’t suffer from this problem, but it still runs into trouble.
It qualifies both RED and RED ∨ WORM as difference-makers. But if difference-making
is causation, as LM claim, we arguably shouldn’t admit disjunctive difference-makers like
RED ∨ WORM, on pain of abundant overdetermination (cf. Lewis (1986b, p. 267)).
A later account of Yablo’s (2003), based on naturalness, shares this trouble. Yablo
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defines: ‘A property P of x is egregiously weak (relative to effect y) iff some more natural
stronger property of x is better proportioned to y than P is.’ Further: A property Q+
is better proportioned to y than a weaker property Q- is ‘iff y would not have occurred,
had x possessed Q- but not Q+’ (324). On this definition, RED is no better proportioned
to PECK than (RED ∨ WORM) is. Hence, (RED ∨ WORM) is not egregiously weak.
That’s enough to ensure that it qualifies as a proportional cause of PECK on Yablo’s
(2003) account.
12This issue is known in the literature as an instance of the “disjunction problem”
for proportionality. Franklin-Hall (2016) explores the disjunction problem for accounts
implementing Woodward-style interventionism. Franklin-Hall’s discussion is independent
of ours, since our counterfactual accounts are not wedded to interventionism. Shapiro and
Sober (2012) also discuss the disjunction problem. Their discussion is independent of ours
as well, since they only target accounts which employ condition (ii) as the sole criterion
for difference-making.
13A recent alternative proposal is Rubenstein (unpublished), who identifies badly dis-
junctive events as those which are not cohesive, a notion which he links to our scientific
practice of curve-fitting.
14If one is skeptical of extending naturalness from properties to events, here’s an
alternative: Restrict yourself to simple events for whose occurrence a proposition of
the form pa is Fq (for example, “Sophie pecks”) states necessary and sufficient conditions.
Where pa is Fq expresses such a proposition for event e, call the property expressed
by F a characteristic property of e. Then define: e is badly disjunctive iff any of its
characteristic properties is badly disjunctive. Then follow Langton and Lewis’s definition
of bad disjunctiveness for properties.
15A “disjunctive expansion” of x is any way to divide up x into jointly exhaustive (but
not necessarily mutually exclusive) disjuncts. (This presupposes that events have the
requisite logical structure, an assumption which follows e.g. on Lewis’s (1986) account,
where events are sets of spacetime regions.) Lewis considers different variations of the
given proposal, including substituting “much more” with “more”, and “all” with “some”.
Each move would enlarge the set of bad disjunctions.
16We also get that the right-hand side of Requiredness is never vacuous: No event neces-
sitates only badly disjunctive events, since every event necessitates the all-encompassing
event.
17There are also circumstances in which upwards exclusion is achieved by condition
(ii). This happens if the effect y occurs somewhere inside the set of closest ¬z-worlds but
outside the set of closest ¬x-worlds. I’ll ignore this case for the most part, only returning
to it briefly in Fn. 19.
18Proof: The set of closest INTEND-worlds is the innermost sphere, which is a subset of
T. Hence INTEND → T. The same holds for INTEND-S, and so INTEND-S → T.
The closest ¬INTEND-worlds are all and only the ¬INTEND worlds in the second-closest
23
sphere, and so are a subset of ¬T. Similarly, the set of all closest ¬INTEND-S-worlds is a
subset of ¬T. Hence also INTEND → T and ¬INTEND → ¬T. 
19 In addition, upwards exclusion may occur due to condition (ii) (cf. Fn. 17). Let x be
a low-level event and z be a high-level event necessitated by x. It’s logically possible that,
even though the effect is absent in all closest ¬x-worlds, it’s nonetheless present in some
closest ¬z-worlds. In this case, even though x satisfies condition (ii), z violates it. In the
examples I am concerned with, this case doesn’t occur.
20Proof: Suppose z violates (i) and x satisfies (i). Since both x and z actually occur,
and x necessitates z, the set of closest x-worlds is a subset of the set of closest z-worlds.
Now suppose, for contradiction, that the set of closest x-worlds is identical to the set of
closest z-worlds. Then, since the effect occurs at all closest x-worlds (x satisfies condition
(i)), it also occurs at all closest z-worlds, in contradiction with z’s violating condition (i). 
21The counterfactuals in question are any truths of the form “If A, the world would be
very different; but if A and B, the world would not be very different.” Here, “very different”
is supposed to track our pretheoretic similarity judgments. Since the closest A ∧B-world
lies no closer to the actual world than the closest A-world, the counterfactual is true only
if the formal similarity relation disagrees with pretheoretic similarity. (Lewis (1979, p. 466)
attributes this point independently to Pavel Tichý and Richard J. Hall.)
22Cf. Lewis (1973, p. 27), who provides similar evidence for strong centering, in the
form of an imagined conversation between two participants who consider a counterfactual
conditional while disagreeing about the truth value of its antecedent.
Interestingly, Lewis (1973, p. 3) thinks that we can’t ‘directly’ test strong centering,
since ordinary counterfactuals ‘carry some sort of presupposition that the antecedent is
false’. The presupposition would make it hard to investigate whether our pre-theoretic
reading validates “And-to-If”, since it would be hard to disentangle our intuitions about
the falsity of a counterfactual from our sense of defect resulting from presupposition failure.
But Lewis’s views about presupposition are doubtful. To take a famous example from
Anderson (1951): ‘In the investigation of Jones’ death, a doctor might say, “If Jones had
taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact
show”.’ In this case, the counterfactual doesn’t seem to carry any presupposition that the
antecedent is false. These Anderson-type cases may be viewed as additional evidence in
favor of strong centering. (Thanks to Cian Dorr here.)
23LM (2009, note 25) also claim that their account is compatible with Lewis (1979). But
that’s false. Lewis’s similarity metric entails strong centering up to qualitative duplication:
‘It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law. It is of
the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect
match of particular fact prevails.’ (1979, p. 472) The actual world matches itself perfectly
in these respects, unlike any world qualitatively different from it.
24Proof: Suppose that
(i) x → y
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(ii) (¬x) → ¬y
(i*) z → y
(ii*) (¬z) → ¬y
Since x ⊂ z, there is a ((¬x)&z)-world. Now simply modify the innermost sphere to
include that world. If the world is a ¬y-world, then (i)* is false, while (i), (ii), and (ii*)
remain true. If it is a y-world, then (ii) is false, while (i), (i*), and (ii*) remain true. 
25Since this condition involves requiredness, it also has a McGrath analogue (substituting
“required” by “McGrath-required”, cf. note 9). Again, there isn’t much daylight between
the two conditions (assuming that the quantifier in “McGrath-requiredness” is restricted to
not-badly-disjunctive properties). They come apart only in cases where a high-level cause
“barely” fails to screen off its low-level realizer, in the sense that, in the absence of the
low-level realizer, the effect might occur but it also might not. In this case, the high-level
cause isn’t McGrath-enough, but it may still be (Yablo-)enough. McGrath-enoughness is
stronger than (Yablo-)enoughness.
26I’m borrowing the “horizontal”/“vertical” terminology from Franklin-Hall (2015). Inci-
dentally, Franklin-Hall defends an account which achieves horizontal and vertical selection
simultaneously. Her defense rejects the prevailing view, endorsed in Mill (1874), Lewis
(1986a), Hall (2004), and Schaffer (2012), that our practice of horizontal selection is
‘capricious’ (Mill’s words) and highly sensitive to conversational context.
27This mirrors the now likewise commonplace distinction between “full” and “partial”
ground (Fine, 2012).
28We’ve already seen that his demand for Contingency is redundant. In addition, Yablo
proposes a demand for “Adequacy”. The idea here is to check not only for the truth of the
consequent given the truth of the antecedent, but also for the truth of the consequent given
the truth of the antecedent, given the falsity of the antecedent. This, intuitively, is another
measure for how reliably the effect arises from the cause, and serves to exclude excessively
high-level causes. To illustrate: In (Sophie), had the target not been colored—e.g. had it
been uniformly white—then, if it had been colored, the target might plausibly have been
blue. For, we may suppose, had the target been white, the scientists would still have had
red and blue targets available. So, the scientists might have picked a blue target. So Sophie
might not have pecked. Formally, Yablo defines Adequacy as follows:
Adequacy: x is adequate for y iff (¬x) → (x → y).
But as with Contingency, a demand for Adequacy seems redundant. Its work is already
done by Enoughness. In (Sophie), COLORED is already excluded on the grounds that it is
not enough; similarly with INTEND-S in the taxi case. Yablo himself introduces Adequacy
with the following example:
(Boiler) ‘Safety valves are designed to open quickly under extreme pressure,
thus easing the burden on the equipment upstream. This particular valve
has begun to operate as advertised when a freak molecular misalignment
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stiffens the mechanism; this decelerates the opening to just past the point
of endurance and the boiler explodes. Assuming that the explosion does
not result from the valve’s opening per se, I ask why not. Because the
contingency condition is violated? But we can arrange it so that the explosion
was contingent on the opening, say, by stipulating that if the opening had
not occurred, rather than the boiler’s exploding the connecting pipe would
have burst. Adequacy does better: given the unlikelihood of the molecular
mishap, had the opening failed to occur, it might easily have been quicker if
it had. Speaking then of how things would have been if not for the opening,
it cannot be said that, were it to have occurred, it would still have brought
the explosion in its wake.’ (1992, pp. 275–6)
A demand for Adequacy excludes the valve’s opening (simpliciter): Had the valve not
opened, then, if it had, it might not have opened in the freak-molecular-mishap-way it
actually did. It might instead have opened sufficiently quickly to prevent the boiler’s
explosion. However, Enoughness already excludes the valve’s opening (simpliciter). This is
because something more specific is required, namely the valve’s opening slowly. (Had the
valve opened, but not slowly, then the boiler would have been fine.) So Yablo’s example
fails to motivate a demand for Adequacy.
29Proof: Suppose x is a difference-making cause of y, i.e.,
(i*) x → y,
(ii*) (¬x) → ¬y.
Since z necessitates x, (i*) entails, by (DM),
(j*) z → y.
Further, we suppose that the causal relation between x and y is realization-sensitive, i.e.,
(RS) ((¬z) ∧ x) → ¬y.
(RS) together with (ii*) and the fact that z necessitates x implies
(jj*) (¬z) → ¬y.
(To see this last inference: Suppose, for contradiction, that some closest ¬z-world α is
a y-world. By (RS), all closest (¬z) ∧ x-worlds are ¬y-worlds. So α must be a closest
(¬z)∧ (¬x)-world. By (ii*) and the fact that z necessitates x, all closest (¬z)∧ (¬x)-worlds
are ¬y-worlds. Hence α is also a ¬y-world. Contradiction.) But (j*) and (jj*) are just the
conditions for z’s being a difference-maker for y. 
30Exclusion is maintained even for realization-sensitive setups. To repeat, the causal
relation between cause x and effect y is realization-sensitive iff there is a lower-level z (a
z whose occurrence necessitates x’s occurrence) such that y wouldn’t have occurred had
x occurred without z. In this case, z may or may not be required for y. (For z to be
required for y, it must be that for every higher-level x, y wouldn’t occur had x occurred
26
without z.) If z is required, then x isn’t enough, and hence not a difference-maker. If z
isn’t required, then z itself is not a difference-maker (and x may still be enough).
31Special thanks to Alex Kaiserman and Cian Dorr, for discussion and encouragement in
the project’s early stages, and for helpful comments in the project’s later stages, respectively.
Many thanks also Michael Strevens for valuable feedback, in person and in writing. I also
owe gratitude to the journal’s two anonymous referees, whose comments pushed me to
improve several central aspects of the paper. Finally, thanks to the Swiss Study Foundation
for financial support.
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